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The most influential opponents of the embryo research and embryo experimentation claim that a 
person with the rights to life begins to exist at the moment of fertilization. They argue that such a 
scientific practices are tantamount to murder and, therefore, that thy are absolutely morally and 
legally impermissible The advocates of such a viewpoint appealed most frequently to three 
arguments with the purpose of supporting the stance that fertilization should be nominated as the 
time at which full moral status is acquired: (i) Genetical Argument – at the “moment” of 
fertilization a genetically human being is created, (ii) Continuity Argument – in the post-
fertilization period a continuum of developmental changes is such that it is impossible to isolate 
any stage to which we could attribute the attainment of moral status, (iii) Individuality Argument – 
it is the same individual right through from the moment of fertilization until the end.  This article 
considers exclusively the question whether the Continuity Argument really supports the approach 
according to which fertilization is a determinant of moral status. I will try to show that from the 
most persuasive interpretation of Continuity Argument does not follow: (1) that the fertilization is 
necessary determinant of moral status; (2) that the fertilization is the most reasonable determinant 
of moral status. In short, I will try to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that 
embryo research and embryo experimentation are morally impermissible.  
 
 
 The development of biotechnology imposed to us numerous extremely complex ethical 
dilemmas. One of the most important question relevant for the wide spectrum of 
scientific and medical procedures such as, for instance, embryo research and 
experimentation, assisted reproductions practices, cloning to abortion are: When does 
a person begin to exist? In other words, is there, at some time during prenatal 
development, a crucial “marker event” before which there is no being to whom we 
have a moral obligation, and after which, there is? Is there any determinant of the 
moral status of person (prenatal or postnatal) and is it attainable by our cognitive 
capacities? It is far beyond the purpose of this article to consider all these questions 
and all these medical procedures. However, I will try to contribute to this important 
debate by discussing one rather precise question: should we nominate fertilization as a 
marker event on the basis of the Continuity Argument?   
The main aim of this article is to analyse the Continuity Argument, one of the 
arguments on which is grounded the moral condemnation of embryo research and 
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experimentation. In the first part, I will give a very brief account of the approach that 
attributes the status of marker event to fertilisation. I will focus in this paper 
exclusively on the Continuity Argument in favour of fertilization approach, offering 
three possible interpretation of it. Finally, I will just register certain scientific facts that 
may call into question the first two interpretations. In the second part, I will isolate and 
analyze the third and the most persuasive interpretation of Continuity Argument. 
However, I will try to show that from this scientifically and philosophically well 
grounded interpretation of Continuity Argument does not follow: (1) that the 
fertilization is necessary determinant of moral status; (2) that the fertilization is the 
most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, I will try to show that this very 
argument does not entail the stance that embryo experimentation and research are 
morally impermissible. It has to be stressed that I will not argue here that such a 
conclusion implies that fertilization could not be a marker event or that more 
convincing arguments in favour of fertilization approach could not be offered.   
      
      I  
 
Embryo Experimentation and Fertilization as a Marker Event  
 
In what follows, I shall concentrate exclusively on the problem of moral justification of 
early embryo research and experimentation (what is closely connected with the 
justification of the medical practice of in vitro fertilization or therapeutic cloning). In 
other words, I will refer primarily to the problem of embryo experimentation in its 
earliest stage before the appearance of the primitive streak. Namely, at least in the last 
decade the majority of polemics about the moral and legal permissibility of embryo 
research is focused on this period of the first fourteen days after fertilization and 
before the formation of the primitive streak. Limiting my discussion on this early 
period of embryo development, I do not want to suggest that the day 14 is the 
definitive borderline after which any research is forbidden, but only that there are 
some good arguments against the moral impermissibility of embryo experimentation 
before this term (1).  
The moral judgment about the permissibility of a research or experimentation on an 
embryo requires an answer to the question when does a person with a right to life and 
the other moral rights begin to exist. Consequently, the debate is focused on the 
searching for the marker event or the event that determinate the moral status (2). 
Various landmarks in prenatal development are nominated as this marker event that 
determines a full moral status such as fertilization, segmentation, viability, capacity to 
have an experience, the sentiments of adults, social visibility, the constitution of large 
multiple connected cerebral cortex, the ability for rational reasoning, consciousness, 
self-motivated activity, etc (3).   
The main opponents of the embryo research and experimentation claim that 
conception or fertilization is a crucial moment in prenatal development (4). According 
to this very influential viewpoint that a person with the rights to life of an adult begins 
to exist at the moment of fertilization, the practices of embryo experimentation and 
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embryo research are tantamount to murder and, therefore, absolutely impermissible. 
Fertilization is not exactly a moment but a complex process (lasting about 24 hours) 
initiated by the incorporation of the sperm in the egg, after which the egg completes 
maturation, the genetic material of each condenses into chromosomes, and finally the 
male and the female contributions come together to form the new genotype (5). 
Historically, the opponents of practices such as embryo experimentation have appealed 
most frequently to this fact about the formation of a new genetic code. It is concluded 
that fertilization marks the beginning of a genetically unique human life and therefore 
the beginning of a new individual, a person with all the rights of an adult and that it is 
wrong to destroy such an individual life because of what it currently is (6). However, in 
more recent discussions this general argument is divided into three arguments with the 
purpose of supporting the stance that fertilization should be nominated as the time at 
which full moral status is acquired: (i) Genetical Argument – at the “moment” of 
fertilization a genetically human being is created; (ii) Continuity Argument – in the 
post-fertilization period a continuum of developmental changes is such that it is 
impossible to isolate any stage to which we could attribute the attainment of moral 
status, (iii) Individuality Argument – it is the same individual right through from the 
moment of fertilization until the end (7).  
I will focus in this paper only on the second, Continuity Argument, and try to show that 
there are serious scientific and philosophical obstacles to inferring from the 
assumptions of this Argument the stance that fertilization is a determinant of moral 




What is exactly argued by this argument? The proponents of this argument view post-
fertilization development as a continuous process in which there is no any event to 
which it is possible to attribute the nomination of a marker event. In contrast to this 
post-fertilization continuity, fertilization is seen as a crucial discontinuity or 
“transformation” in development (8). 
It has to be noticed that in the literature there are certain terminological ambiguities 
concerning this argument that provokes further confusion. Namely, three 
interpretations of various strengths can be detected: (i) the strongest claim is that 
continuity implies the denial of any genetic and numerical developmental changes in 
the post-fertilization process; (ii) the moderate claim does not exclude some 
developmental changes, but it is argued that the continuity means that there are no 
crucial changes in the sense of discontinuity or relevant “transformation” in 
development; (iii) the weakest version is the claim that the post-fertilization process is 
continuous in the sense that there is no one single moment identifiable as a marker 
event, but that development after fertilization is a gradual process. In short, according 
to the first interpretation of the Continuity Argument, after fertilization there are no 
genetical and numerical changes; according to the second interpretation, there are 
some changes, but these changes are not crucial discontinuity events in comparison 
with fertilization; and according to the third interpretation, it is allowed that there are 
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developmental changes, perhaps some of them could be crucial, but it is not possible 
to isolate one single moment to which the attribution of discontinuity could be 
ascribed. Regardless of these different versions of the Continuity Argument, the 
conclusion is the same: the continuity of post-fertilization development is the reason 
why we have to ascribe to fertilization a status of marker event.  
If we tend to a systematic elaboration of the foundation for the moral condemnation of 
embryo research based on Continuity Argument, each of these three interpretations 
has to be considered apart from each other. 
 
1. CONTINUITY WITHOUT ANY CHANGES. According to the first, initial and most 
demanding interpretation of Continuity Argument, any variations during or subsequent 
to fertilization is not allowed. This interpretation of the continuity of post-fertilization 
development is understood as a natural implication of the stance that the genotype is 
definitely formed at the moment of fertilization and can be found primarily at the 
proponents of genetical argument (9). However, two standard forms of such an 
interpretation Continuity Argument have to be distinguished: (i) genetical Continuity 
Argument and (ii) numerical Continuity Argument. On the one hand, the notion of 
genetical continuity means that in the post-fertilization period there are no 
developmental changes in the genotype, i.e. that there is genetical continuity between 
embryo and me. On the other hand, it is claimed that there is no numerical 
discontinuity in the post-fertilization period, that is, that fertilization results with the 
final formation of a single entity. This means that there is a numerical continuity 
between the embryo and me. I will briefly register some scientific facts that could call 
into question such an interpretation of both genetical and numerical continuity.  
On the one side, scientific research does not support the conclusion about the lack of 
genetic changes after fertilization. In spite of a certain terminological indeterminacy 
concerning the notion of genetic change, such a Continuity Argument, in principle, 
assumes that genetic make-up is something static and constant from the moment of 
fertilization that crucially determines all further prenatal and postnatal development. 
Scientists stress a certain overemphasizing of the role of genetics in directing the 
course of events after fertilization. The dependence on the fidelity of a new genotype 
formed at fertilization throughout all subsequent development is limited. Scientific 
research suggests that differentiation is a dynamic process and that the environment 
contributes to subtle continuous changes throughout a whole lifetime. The genotype of 
any individual may not be that which is formed at fertilization. Environment is a 
potential force in the course of development both pre-natally and post-natally. 
Successful completion of fertilization in no way assures development through to birth 
or even the commencement of embryo development (10). 
On the other side, scientists have generally dismissed the numerical Continuity 
Argument based on the equation: 1 egg + 1 sperm = 1 embryo =1 individual. The 
formation of a single zygote or early embryo in the fertilization may be the forerunner 
of the development of multiple identical individuals. It is not necessary that an early 
embryo marks the beginning of a human entity that is numerically continuous 
throughout all subsequent development. For instance, identical twins arise from a 
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single embryo that splits around 14 days in about one out of every 270 pregnancies 
coming to term. It is worth noticing that it has been estimated that a significant 
proportion of identical twins are lost either through spontaneous abortion, or the loss of 
one foetus which results in singleton development and birth. Consequently, scientists 
suggest that the twinning is not a rare phenomenon at all that can be interpreted as a 
kind of deformation in post-fertilization period.  Early embryonic cells are totipotent 
what means that an early human embryo has the potential to become one or more 
different individuals (11). There is also an opposite phenomenon when two eggs are 
fertilized, two embryos (or zygotes) and two genetic codes exist, but around the 6th 
day two embryos combine forming a chimera and continue to develop as a single 
organism. 
In short, in spite of fact that these scientific comments have been only sketched here, it 
seems that there are serious scientific challenges to the viewpoint or even the myth of 
genetic determinism and numerical continuity.   
 
2. CONTINUITY WITHOUT CRUCIAL DEVELOPMENTAL DISCONTINUITIES. 
According to the second interpretation, the theses about continuity allow certain 
developmental changes, but not a crucial discontinuity or “transformation” in 
development to which we can ascribe the attribute of marker event (12). In spite of the 
lack of a precise meaning of “discontinuity” or what it has to be seen as a discontinuity 
or developmental transformation, it can be concluded, that, as well as the first 
interpretation, scientific research does not unambiguously support this interpretation.       
At the beginning, it has to be stressed that fertilization may not necessarily result with 
the formation of embryo. Namely, in the case of dispermy, in spite of fertilization, the 
embryo is not formed. Also, it is worthwhile noting that for up to 78% of human 
fertilizations the endpoint is loss rather than progression to the next developmental 
stage (13). The fact is that any other event or process after fertilization taken by 
theoreticians as a marker event has a better statistics of further development. These 
scientific findings absolutely do not prove that fertilization is not marker event, but in 
the light of these facts, the claim about fertilization as the crucial and unique 
discontinuity event in development of a human being probably looses some initial 
intuitive strength.  
Furthermore, there are no convincing scientific and ethical arguments from the 
proponents of fertilization approach against the possibilities that some other events or 
processes could be taken as the crucial developmental transformations. For instance, 
at least two processes in the post-fertilization development are proposed by scientists as 
the processes that mark some important transformation in the development of a human 
being: (i) segmentation and (ii) the formation of a functioning cortex.  
Segmentation may be considered as the splitting of the embryo to form multiple 
identical individuals, or the recombining of twins or triplets to form a single individual. 
Twinning and chimera formation are complete at about 13 or 14 days after 
fertilization, in the case of in vivo development, when the primitive streak begins to 
form in the embryonic disc. Many philosophers defend the stance that segmentation is 
the determinant of moral status or marker event because at the completion of this stage 
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there is no longer any possibility of segmentation occurring and the single being 
becomes twins, triplets, etc (14). Some others do not hold that segmentation is the 
determinant of moral status or the beginning of an individual life with full moral status, 
but argue in favour of segmentation as a beginning of particular human life (15). Also, 
some committees’ reports about human (pre-)embryo experimentation have 
recommended that research using in vitro human prenates should not be permitted 
beyond 14 days after fertilization (16). Such stances coincide with segmentation as the 
crucial discontinuity moment in the post-fertilization period. In any case, the approach 
that defends the moderate kind of continuity after fertilization overlooks the possibility 
that either twinning or recombination may occur in the normal course of events, 
disrupting the continuum of development and marking the important discontinuity 
event. It has to be noticed that I will not here discuss the question whether 
segmentation is beginning of a particular or individual life or it is not. I only want to 
stress that the process of segmentation is in various scientific and philosophical 
contexts recognized as an important discontinuity in developmental process.       
 The second event or process that could deserve a special status in the post-fertilization 
period is the formation of a functioning cortex. The starting crude scientific fact is that 
the existence of a large multiply connected cerebral cortex distinguishes human beings 
both structurally and functionally from other forms of life. Some scientists have made a 
further, perhaps more metaphysical step, recommending the stance to philosophers 
that, therefore, our species acquire humanness when the enlarged cortex has 
developed, and that the individual human foetus becomes a person with the rights of 
an adult when the cortex begins to function (17). However, such a metaphysical claim 
is beyond this kind of debate. My aim here is only to stress the fact that scientists find 
that this change in post-fertilization development is important discontinuity.    Namely, 
science teaches us that up to the end of the second trimester (or 24th week) of 
pregnancy, nerve cells accumulate in the brain and differentiate, but until that time a 
significant number of connections between those cells are not formed. A pile of nerve 
cells is not a functioning cortex. It becomes a functioning cortex when the system is 
“wired up” by synaptic connections, and this process starts at around twenty-four 
weeks of gestation and continues into childhood. Before the wiring up of the cortex, 
the foetus is simply incapable of feeling anything, including pain. The signals may be 
sent by the nerves earlier, but there is nothing to receive them. Once the synapses start 
forming, however, this sort of categorical statement can no longer be made. 
Undoubtedly, regardless of the question of personhood, such an event that marks the 
beginning of feeling, or “wiring up” of the cortex, has to be a prime candidate for the 
nomination of the discontinuity event in the development of a human being.  
It is worthwhile to stress once more that in this case as well as in the previous of 
segmentation, I do not argue in favour of any positions, but I only try to stress that 
such events or processes, according to scientists, marks the important discontinuities in 
the development. Therefore, the proponents of the second interpretation should take 
into account that there are significant scientific recommendations that in the post-
fertilization process there are crucial discontinuity events or processes and important 
developmental transformations.  
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3. CONTINUITY AS A GRADUAL PROCESS. According to the third and less 
demanding interpretation, the notion of continuity means that post-fertilization is a 
certain gradual process, that is, that we are incapable of identifying one single moment 
as a marker event. This third interpretation is the most usual interpretation of the 
Continuity Argument. In contrast to the previous interpretations, it has to be noticed 
that this interpretation is generally accepted both by scientists and by the majority of 
philosophers from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas until today. Scientists have strong 
reasons to believe that all biology is a matter of gradual change. Consequently, the 
development of a human being is also gradual. Such a widespread consensual 
viewpoint implies that in the post-fertilization development there is no one single 
identifiable moment to which we could attribute the mark of marker event. However, 
we will try to show that from this generally acceptable formulation of Continuity 
Argument does not follow that the fertilization - the beginning of the continuous 
process - is neither necessary nor the most reasonable marker event. It could be 
argued that there are other morally relevant reasons for the nomination of fertilization 
as a marker event. We hope we will show here only that from this most convincing 
interpretation of Continuity Argument does not follow that fertilization has to be 
ascribed with such a nomination.  
 
      I I 
 
Sorites series and the problem of the arbitrary precisification 
 
At the beginning, let us consider in a more detailed manner why, from the thesis about 
the continuity of post-fertilization development, it follows that we cannot isolate one 
single moment as actually being a discontinuity event. It can be useful to recall here 
the ancient notion of continuum. For instance, according to Aristotle, continuum is a 
kind of coherence where coherence is defined as that which touches when it is in 
sequence. Continuum is a species of coherence, such as that both terms by which it is 
contained are one and the same, and, as its name signifies, they are contained; but this 
cannot be when there are two terms. Commenting on this passage of Aristotle, Thomas 
Aquinas says: “For when the ends of two things which touch are made one the same, 
that is said to be a continuum. Continuum is derived from contained (continendum). 
When therefore many parts are contained in one, that is, hold together as it were at 
the same time, then there is continuum. (…) From this it follows further that there 
cannot be continuation except in those things, from which a unity is made naturally by 
contact.” (18) According to this interpretation of continuity, the requirement for the 
identification of one single moment as a certain borderline even contradicts the notion 
of continuous process as unity or wholeness.  
There is also a certain weaker position according to which in continuous processes any 
demarcation is arbitrary. Namely, it has to be noticed that in various areas where we 
deal with the continuous processes or scales - in biology as well as in any other 
domain- we deal with the sorites series. The requirement to identify a single moment in 
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sorites sequence leads to the sorites paradoxes (19) or to “the problem of arbitrary 
precisification” (20). Sorites paradoxes seem to have been introduced by the logician 
Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of Aristotle. The most famous puzzles are Bald 
Mann (i.e. the original Falakros) and Heap (i.e. originally Sorites). In antiquity they 
were usually formulated as series of questions.  
Let us see the Heap: Does one grain of wheat make a heap? Do two grains of wheat 
make a heap? Do three grains of wheat make a heap? Etc. Do ten thousand grains of 
wheat make a heap? If someone admits that one grain does not make a heap, and are 
unwilling to make a fuss about the addition of any single grain, he is eventually forced 
to admit that ten thousand grains do not make a heap. Namely, when someone at first 
denies that one grain makes a heap – which is the only reasonable answer - he should 
later decide between two equally unacceptable answers: that one grain makes a heap 
from a non-heap at some arbitrary point, or to deny that ten thousand grains make a 
heap (21). As well as in the case of the heap, the non-arbitrary identification of one 
single point as a marker event is not possible in many other cases of continuous or 
gradual processes: for instance, in the cases of tallness, baldness, strong wind, a 
mountain, a city, the open sea, when an orange colour in a spectrum becomes red, etc. 
The non-arbitrary isolation of the centimetre at which someone becomes tall or the hair 
when someone becomes bald seems to be hopeless. 
Similarly, if we assume with the majority of scientists that post-fertilisation is a 
continuous process, that is, a certain sorites sequence, the isolation of any moment as 
a marker event would be arbitrary and it would lead us to the sorites paradox. Since, 
we are not principally able to make a non-arbitrary precisification of a crucial moment, 
we cannot isolate a single moment both in prenatal and postnatal development as a 
marker event as well as we cannot find out the moment that determines when 
childhood finishes and puberty begins, when adolescence or maturity begins, etc (22). 
It can be objected here that such an analogy between the cases of baldness or heap 
and the issues about the beginning of the life of a person is ungrounded for two 
reasons: 1.) the paradox is restricted only to quantitative processes like baldness, 
tallness or the like, but not qualitative like post-fertilization development; 2.) there is a 
great difference between baldness and personhood in terms of moral importance.  
However, it seems to us that the paradox is not restricted exclusively to quantitative 
processes. Any continuous process, “including those that referee to qualities such as 
loudness or to stages of temporal development, are susceptible to the sorites paradox” 
(23). For instance, let us see how L.F. Kerckhove and S.Waller illustrate the 
applicability of the sorites paradox to one qualitative process: 
“1. An egg cooked for one second is not a hard boiled egg. 
  2. Cooking the egg one second longer will not affect its doneness. 
  3. Therefore, an egg cooked for two seconds will not be hard boiled. 
  4. Repeat steps (2)-(3).” (24)    
Consequently, any continuous or gradual biological process presents sorites series like 
baldness, tallness but also loudness, red-orange continuum of colour patches, temporal 
development, etc.  
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Secondly, we are deeply aware of the difference in moral importance between the 
debate about baldness and post-fertilization development, but we are here limited to 
no other analogy except in the aspect of continuity. More precisely, while the 
applicability of possible solutions of sorites paradox in the case of personhood could be 
an object of moral concern, it seems that the mere identification of the analogy 
between the different cases of continuous processes cannot (25). The problem of moral 
evaluation will be actualised later with a proposal we will offer.   
Consequently, for the sake of our present debate, we hold that the following reasoning 
is legitimate: 
In the continuous processes or in the sorites series it is not possible to non-arbitrarily 
isolate any single moment as a marker event. 
             Post-fertilization development is continuous process. 
Therefore, in the post-fertilization process it is not possible to non-arbitrarily isolate 
any single moment as the marker event (26). 
Our question will be now whether we should, therefore, with the proponents of 
Continuity Argument, nominate fertilization - the beginning of the continuous 




Should we conclude with the advocates of the Continuity Argument that fertilization is 
necessary marker event because in the continuous process such as prenatal and 
postnatal development the non-arbitrary precisification of one single moment is 
impossible? It seems to us that Continuity Argument failed to support the fertilization 
approach. More precisely, from the fact of the continuous post-fertilization process it 
does not follow that fertilization itself must be the marker event.  
 
1. SORITES PARADOX. When someone claims the Continuity Argument, or from the 
continuous nature of post-fertilization development derives a conclusion that 
fertilization – the very beginning of this continuous process - has to be the marker 
event, they fall into a certain absurd conclusion or in the sorites paradox. L.F. 
Kerckhove & S. Waller construed the following argument, which illustrates the 
applicability of the sorites paradox in the case of a person: 
“ 1. X is a person at age T, where T is twenty-one years old. 
   2.If X is a person at age T, then X is person at T-1 second.  
   3.Therefore, X is a person at T-1. 
   4.Repeat steps (2)- (3). 
Using iterated modus ponens, we can eventually slide from the intuitively plausible 
claim that a twenty-one year old human being is a person to the much stronger claim 
that a newly fertilized ovum is a person.” (27) 
To nominate fertilization as the marker event would be absurd, like claiming that 
someone becomes bald with the first hair he loses because we cannot isolate one single 
moment or a hair when the baldness starts. In spite of the impossibility that we non-
arbitrarily isolate a moment when someone becomes bald, nobody can seriously claim 
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that a person becomes bald with the first hair he loses. Similarly, to derive a claim 
about fertilization as a marker event from the fact of continuity is like deriving that the 
first grain makes a heap, that adolescence begins at conception or that the first drop 
makes an ocean. In short, the inference according to which from the fact of continuous 
process follows that the beginning of a process is the marker event, presents a clear 
case of deficient and unacceptable inference.   
 
2. CONTINUITY DOES NOT IMPLY IDENTITY. It seems that the proponents of 
Continuity Argument assume that if we have a person at some point in the continuous 
process, due to continuity, we have to have a person also at the beginning of this 
process. Let us consider such reasoning in a bit different way. What we know is that 
twenty-one year old (perfectly physically and mentally healthy) Mary is undoubtedly a 
person. There is no single participant in the discussion about personhood who would 
say that twenty-one year old Mary is not a person. Probably, when Mary was ten years 
old, she was a person as well. Perhaps she was a person in her seventh year. Whatever 
we decide, twenty-one year old Mary is an adult with all the rights of a person. Mary, 
who is twenty-one years old, is physically continuous from the egg that was fertilized 
more than twenty-one years ago, and from which she developed. However, it does not 
follow that she became a person when the egg was fertilized. The mere physical 
continuity does not imply necessary identity. For instance, Robert Lane who argues 
that physical continuity does not imply even a numerical identity, wrote:  
 “(…) an early-term PBH (pre-born-human) is not sufficiently similar, either 
anatomically, physiologically, or psychologically, to the late term PBH, infant, or adult 
with which it is physically continuous, to be one and the same thing as any of them.” 
(28) 
 
Accordingly, it could be justifiable to say that in spite of the physical continuity of 
process, things could be of one kind at some point   in development and another at the 
beginning because they can change their identity during this developmental process. 
The continuity of process does not necessarily imply identity during the whole process. 
Someone can hold that a person who is named Mary began to live from conception for 
some other reasons. However, a mere physical continuity is surely not the reason to 
give that we say that a twenty-one year old person was necessarily a person also at the 
moment of fertilization.    
In short, from the facts that a twenty-one year old human being is a person and that 
the process from fertilization to being a twenty-one year old person is continuous, to 
derive that fertilization is the moment when this person began to exist – is an obvious 
non sequitur. The continuous process can be conceived as the process of gradual 
change during which - in spite of the impossibility identifying any single moment as a 
marker event - something that is not a person could become a person (as well as 
during  other sorites series a non-bald person becomes bald, orange colour becomes 
red, etc.). It can be perfectly justified to say that, in spite of the continuity of prenatal 




Fertilisation as the most reasonable marker event 
 
However, it can be objected that such an interpretation of Continuity Argument – that 
continuity necessary implies that fertilization is the marker event – is a certain 
argument of a straw man. Namely, it could be said that in Continuity Argument it is 
only assumed that it is most reasonably to take fertilization as a marker event. 
The two lines or argumentation in favour of such reasoning could be offered. 
1. Since there is an impossibility to identify non-arbitrarily one single moment as a 
marker event, it would be the most reasonable in terms of moral concerns to nominate 
the fertilisation as a marker event. Namely, in the situation when the marker event is 
principally unattainable, attributing fertilization as the marker event we could prevent 
possible murders (29).   
2. If we do not nominate fertilization, due to the continuity of the developmental 
process, it would be impossible to determine any marker event as a basis of moral and 
legal regulation. Namely, fertilization is the only salient event or the only clearly 
identifiable event in the developmental process. So, since moral and legal purposes 
impose on us the need for some event that can be nominated as a marker event, 
fertilization is not only a suitable marker event, but also – due to continuity - the only 
possible such event (30).   
 
Let us notice that such reasoning would be justified only under two stronger 
interpretations of continuity that reject the existence of developmental changes, or at 
least the existence of crucial changes in the post-fertilization development. If there are 
no changes, or no crucial changes, any marker event in the post-fertilization period 
would be unreachable. However, under the third interpretation according to which 
continuous post-fertilization development is the process of gradual changes, such an 
argumentation loses its basis. If we are right, under the assumption that the 
developmental process is a process of gradual changes, fertilization is not the most 
reasonable marker event.   
In the sorites series, from the fact that we cannot identify non-arbitrarily one single 
point as a demarcation line it does not follow that we cannot know that a person 
somewhere during the process of losing hair becomes bald, or that we cannot know 
that the life of a person begins somewhere during this continuous process. Namely, 
in spite of the fact that we cannot isolate one single moment, we can isolate the zone 
or area where the crucial change happens.    
Let me elaborate this stance in more detail. Some scientists claim that we can be 
perfectly sure that a person begins to live with a functioning cortex, and at the same 
time that it is impossible to isolate one single moment as the moment when the cortex 
becomes “wired up”. For instance, H.J. Morowitz and J.S. Trefil claim that (i) the 
individual human fetus becomes a person with rights when the cortex begins to 
function; (ii) the cortex becomes functioning when the system is “wired up” by 
synaptic connections; (iii) this process starts at around twenty-four weeks of gestation 
(31). Such an example illustrates clearly that the continuity - the stance about the 
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impossibility to isolate non-arbitrarily one single moment as a marker event -  does not 
imply the stance that we don’t know when a person begins to live, or what are the 
features that make a person. In other words, the thesis that it is not possible to identify 
a non-arbitrary demarcation line as a marker event could be perfectly compatible with 
the stance that, for instance, there is some zone or area of the cortex formation (or 
segmentation, or some other) that can be the determinant of moral status.  
In the general philosophical debate about sorites paradoxes, a certain solution that 
supports previous reasoning about the possibility to determine an area as the marker 
process has been already offered as certain pragmatical strategies that treat sorites-
infected paradoxes (32). In spite of the fact that we cannot say exactly at which point 
someone becomes tall, bald, when the door is open or when an egg is hard boiled, we 
can perfectly distinguish a tall person from a small one, a bald person from one who is 
not bald, when a door is open or when an egg is hard boiled and when is not. In other 
words, in the sorites series the existence of change from a non-bald person to bald, 
from a non-heap to heap, from an orange colour in red, non-person to person is 
unquestionable. This suggests that, in spite of the impossibility to non-arbitrarily isolate 
a precise one single moment as a marker point, it could be possible to define a 
relevant sequence or simply a grey area in which the crucial change happens.  
For instance, in spite of the fact that we cannot isolate the centimetre when a person 
becomes tall, all semantically competent speakers (who understand the notion “tall” 
and who know how to use this notion) agree that a person of 160 cm is not tall while a 
person of 190 cm is tall. Terrence Horgan’s proposal of relevant sequence can be 
applied here as a sort of pragmatical solution of the sorites paradoxes because it can 
provide us with a workable solution concerning the determination of a marker area in 
the continuous processes (33). Precisely, when scientists and moral philosophers would 
agree about the features that make a person, there will not be any principal obstacles 
to the isolation of a relevant sequence, or grey area, to which they can attribute a 
nomination of marker area (34).  The line can be simply drawn in the general area of 
the appearance of the morally relevant feature. For instance, let us imagine that 
scientists and philosophers make a consensus that the segmentation is a morally 
relevant developmental change. As well, as we say that after 190 centimetres a person 
is tall, we could say that after the day 14, any scientific intervention or research on 
embryos is forbidden. Neither the 190 centimetres, nor day 14 is an arbitrary line, 
but the end of the sequence after which the uncertainty disappears. Namely, in the 
case of segmentation, the grey area finishes for sure at day 14 in in vivo development 
(and even later in vitro development) when the appearance of the primitive streak 
precludes the embryo becoming two or more different individuals. Therefore, if the 
scientists and moral philosophers would agree that segmentation (or the formation of a 
functioning cortex or some other event) is a morally relevant change in development, 
the fact about the continuity of developmental process would not be an obstacle to 
determine one of these processes as a marker area. The line that could be drawn at 
the end (or in the case of the cortex functioning, at the beginning) of a general or grey 
area would be also completely reasonable and a non-arbitrary line.  
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Morally malign and benign arbitrariness 
 
Someone can now reasonably object that our proposal failed and that we have not 
escaped from the arbitrariness because the lines that determine the beginning or the 
end of grey areas must be also arbitrary. For instance, we chose the 160 cm and 190 
cm as the borderlines of the grey area in which someone becomes tall. Someone could, 
quite intelligibly, ask why not 159 cm and 188 cm? Moreover, we could have been, 
and probably should have been more precise and chose the sequence from 170cm-
186cm. In the light of such reasoning, a kind of arbitrariness in our proposal is 
inevitable. However, it seems to me that, in contrast to the malign arbitrariness tat 
characterize sorites paradoxes, such arbitrariness is of the morally benign kind. In our 
example, it can be taken as granted in the highest possible degree that nobody under 
160 cm is tall and anybody over 190 cm is not tall. Such arbitrariness is benign in the 
comparison of pointing, for instance, 184 cm as the demarcation line when someone 
becomes tall. There is no reason why 183cm or 186 cm instead of 184 cm are not 
chosen as demarcation lines. Namely, we cannot conceive or imagine any explanatory 
basis that would single out some unique candidate over against its competitors. It is 
definitely much more accurate to say that someone becomes tall in the sequence from 
160-190 cm, than at 184 cm. The pragmatic  solutions, as well as this way of thinking 
about benign arbitrariness, is far more appropriate in bioethical discussions where 
indifference about hypothetical solutions is intolerable and where moral deliberation in 
each particular case would minimize the possibility of mistakes.     
Similarly, under the assumption that the segmentation is the morally relevant 
developmental change, day 14 can be chosen as the end of the relevant period after 
which (in the case of in vivo development) there is no any possibility for twinning or 
chimera formation because the primitive streak definitely begins to form in the 
embryonic disc. It should be stressed here that the dynamics of in vitro and in vivo 
development are not identical. The development of the in vitro embryo up until about 
7 days after fertilization is roughly equivalent to that in vivo. Beyond this, however, 
there is no equivalence in development; no primitive streak will be formed in vitro 
embryos at the stage of 14 days (35). Since in vitro development is much slower then 
in vivo, such a line is definitely the most secure line before which, for instance, 
embryo experimentation can be accomplished without any fear that the primitive streak 
can be formed. Day 14 as the line before which embryo experimentation can be 
performed is arbitrary in a morally very benign sense, because it, in the highest 
degree, excludes the possibility that we make a mistake concerning the formation of 
the primitive streak (and, under the assumption that segmentation is the marker 
process, to kill a person).  
 
      *** 
It has to be emphasized at the end that the final decision about whether fertilization or 
the segmentation or formation of a cortex or some other process has to be determinant 
of moral status is the question of further scientific research and moral appraisal of 
scientific facts about these processes. I have only tried to prove that Continuity 
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Argument failed, that is, that from the more detailed analysis of the notion of 
continuity it does not follow that that fertilization is both necessary and the most 
reasonable marker event. Consequently, contrary to the Continuity Argument on which 
the fertilization approach is based, it can be argued that the post-fertilization process is 
continuous and gradual, and that fertilization is not the determinant of moral status. In 
other words, it is possible to accept scientifically and philosophically convincing ideas 
about the continuity of developmental process, and at the same time to claim that 
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(1) I will rely here on the several influential documents in which it is assumed the day 
14 as a borderline. See, Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues 
Arising from In Vitro Fertilization. Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by 
In Vitro Fertilization, (Prof. Louis Waller, chairman). Melbourne: Victorian 
Government Printer; 1984. para. 3.29.; Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Human Fertilization and Embryology (Mary Warnock, chair). London: HMSO; 1984. 
para. 11.19-11.22. 
(2) It should be noted here that while such a discussion assumes that moral status of 
some medical practices depends on the questions of personhood or on the 
determination of the time, event or process when a full moral status is acquired, there 
is also an alternative approach. Namely, some authors claim that the determination of 
marker events or discussion about the status of embryo (or fetus) is not relevant for the 
moral judgement of these practices. Arguments in favor of this alternative viewpoint 
can be found on both sides of the debate. For instance, J. J. Thomson claims that 
abortion could be permissible even if fetus is a person, while D. Marquis holds that 
abortion would be impermissible even if fetus is not a person. It could be possible to 
see a promising alternative with R. Dworkin in stance that moral judgements should be 
based instead on the question of the intrinsic value of life or with L.F. Kerchove & S. 
Waller in the debate about balancing interest. See J. J. Thomson, 1971; D. Marquis, 
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1994; R. M. Dworkin, 1993; L. F. Kerchove & S. Waller, 1998. It is however far 
beyond our purposes to compare these general approaches. We will limit our debate 
exclusively on the still predominant issue about the marker event. 
(3) See, for instance, T. J. Noonan 1970; M. A. Warren 1973; M. Tooley 1983; H. J. 
Morowitz & J. S. Trefil 1992.  
(4) See, for instance, John Paul II 1995; J. Finnis 1973; T. J. Noonan 1970. 
(5) R. G. Harison 1978; S. Buckle, K. Dawson, P. Singer 1993. 
(6) A number of philosophers, on both sides, think that it is wrong to destroy such an 
individual life – not (or not only) because of what it currently is – but because of what 
it has a potential to become. However, this interesting, relevant and extremely importat 
discussion about the potentiality argument is beyond our present interest. 
(7) See in K. Dawson, 1993. 
(8) G. C. Grisez, 1970; W. Quinn, 1970; T. J. Noonan, 1970; T. Iglesias, 1984. 
(9) R. Werner, 1974: R. Wertheimer, 1971; B. Brody, 1978; J. Santamaria, 1982. 
(10) K. Dawson, 1993. 
(11) H. Kuhse & P. Singer, 1993. 
(12) T. J. Noonan, 1991. 
(13) C. J. Roberts & C.R. Lowe, 1975. 
(14) P. Ramsey, 1970; C.E. Curran, 1978. 
(15) H. Kuhse & P. Singer, 1993. 
(16) Committe to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issue Arising from In Vitro 
Fertilization. Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization. 
Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization, (Prof. Louis 
Waller, chairman). Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer; 1984. para. 3.29.; 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology, (Mary 
Warnock, chair). London: HMSO; 1984. para. 11.19-11.22. 
(17) H.J. Morowitz & J.S. Trefil, 1992. 
(18) See in R. McKeon, (ed.), 1930, pp. 439-440. 
(19) See, for instance, in R.A. Sorensen, 1988; T. Williamson, 1993; L.F. Kerchove 
and S. Waller, 1998. K. Ludwig and G. Ray, 2002. 
(20) See in T. Horgan, 1997. 
(21) Sorites paradoxes can be presented also as argument with premises and 
conclusions. Let us see the puzzle Bald man: 
Premise 1: The loss of one hair is too few to nominate a man as bald. 
Premise 2: If 1 is few then 2 are few. 
Premise 3: If 2 are few then 3 are few. 
Etc. 
Premise 200 000: If 199 999 are few then 200 000 are few. 
Conclusion: The loss of 200 000 hairs is too few to nominate a man as bald. 
See in T. Williamson, 1993, p. 39. 
(22) According to L.F. Kerckhove and S. Waller, a connection between the debate 
about personhood and the sorites paradox has been recognized by R. A. Sorensen and 
R. Shafer Landau. See, L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller, 1998. 
(23) L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller, 1998, pp. 179-80. 
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(24) Ibid., p. 180. 
(25) For instance, according to certain epistemic solutions to the sorites paradox (R. 
Sorensen, T. Williamson), boundaries exist out in the mind-independent world, but 
they are unknown to us. While such a principal ignorance of a demarcation line can be 
an acceptable solution in the case of baldness, the same indifference about our 
ignorance is unacceptable when we have to make a moral decision about embryo 
experimentation or abortion. See R. A. Sorensen, 1984; T. Williamson, 1994. 
(26) It is worth noticing that one of the most important philosophical dilemmas 
concerning this issue is whether (i) we are incapable of identifying one such single 
point although it really exists, or (ii) we are incapable to nominate non-arbitrarily one 
single point as a borderline because it does not exist (it is assumed the ontological view 
according to which the world itself is a fuzzy place). The majority of philosophers who 
write on vagueness and sorites paradox take it to be a kind of semantic phenomenon. 
However, the debate about these issues is out of our present task. We will assume 
what is commonsense view or at least what is evident – that we are incapable non 
arbitrarily identifying one single point in the continuous process, not considering the 
possible hypothesis about the ontological, epistemic or semantic reasons for such 
incapacity. 
(27) L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller, 1998, p. 181. 
(28) R. Lane, 2003, p. 69. 
(29) John Paul II, 1995. 
(30) See in S. Buckle, 1993. 
(31) H.J. Morowitz & J.S. Trefil, 1992. 
(32) See, for instance, D. Rafman, 1994; R. Manor, 1997. 
(33) Concerning the problem of the vagueness, T. Horgan defends a position of 
trnsavalutionism. According to him, there are two fundamental claims of 
transvaluationism: (i) The Incoherence Thesis – vagueness is logically incoherent in a 
certain way; (ii) The Legitimacy Thesis – vagueness is viable and legitimate nontheless, 
even an essential aspect of human thought and speech. He favours the idea of 
contextual and psychologistic semantics in which operational standards may vary 
according to the internal (similarly to D. Raffman) and external circumstances at hand 
(similarly to R. Manor). This means that epistemological and ontological commitments 
are to be kept as strict as possible, but never add up to ultimate, reductive, absolute or 
universal ones. Finally, he argues that when we force through a sorites series, the 
discourse ultimately gets regimented around a “collettivistic” pole (to be compared 
with Raffman’s pairwise constraint). See in T. Horgan, 1994, 1997, 1998. See also in 
B. Van Kerkhove, 2000. 
(34) Let us notice that in the post-fertilization developmental process, in contrast to 
other sorites series, there are disagreements about the features that make a person 
(possession of human DNA, unique genetic code, viability, functioning cortex, 
consciousness, rationality, etc.). For instance, while it is clear what features make an 
egg hard boiled or what features characterize puberty, there is no consensus about the 
properties which define a person. However, when scientists and philosophers would 
agree what properties define a person, a fact that a developmental process is 
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continuous would not prevent us from defining a relevant sequence. On the other 
hand, it is possible to say that it is not possible in principle todefine the features that 
make a person. However, in such a case, the very fact of continuity will not be a 
reason why we cannot identify a marker event, what it is claimed by Continuity 
Argument. 
(35) R.G. Edwards, 1986. 
 
